

DIPLOMA  
PROGRAMME

**Teacher Support Material**

# History

**Internal Assessment**



INTERNATIONAL  
BACCALAUREATE  
ORGANIZATION

For first examinations in 2003





Diploma Programme

**HISTORY**

Internal Assessment  
Teacher Support Material

**For first examinations in 2003**

International Baccalaureate Organization

Buenos Aires

Cardiff

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History  
Internal Assessment  
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# Introduction

This teacher support material has been prepared by senior examiners and practising teachers of Diploma Programme (DP) history. It should be read in conjunction with the DP *History* guide (published February 2001 for first examinations in 2003). The detailed requirements for the internally assessed components, and the internal assessment criteria, are given in the “Assessment Details” section of the guide.

In brief, the requirements for internal assessment for the history course (first examinations in 2003) are that:

- the student undertakes a historical investigation of his or her choice
- the emphasis is on a specific historical inquiry under the guidance of a teacher
- the student applies the skills of the historian to the investigation.

The historical investigation is assessed against six criteria that are related to the objectives of the history course.

## **The purpose of this document**

This teacher support material has been developed:

- to provide further clarification of the nature of the internal assessment
- to offer guidance to teachers on their role in the production of internal assessment
- to provide teachers with examples of the kinds of work that can be undertaken for the historical investigation
- to show the application of the assessment criteria.

The document includes four outlines illustrating some possible approaches to the historical investigation. These are followed by five examples of the full historical investigation. The examples provided are actual student work and are presented in their original styles, which may include spelling, grammatical and any other errors. All five examples are followed by detailed comments and marks on each criterion, written by senior examiners.

# The Historical Investigation: Guidance for Teachers

<b>What is it?</b>	A historical investigation consisting of a written account of between 1,500 and 2,000 words, divided into six sections: a plan of the investigation, a summary of evidence, an evaluation of sources, an analysis, a conclusion, and a bibliography or list of sources. The investigation must be a written piece and should be the work of the individual student. Group work is not permitted.
<b>Who does it?</b>	All higher level (HL) and standard level (SL) history students.
<b>How many words should there be in each section?</b>	This is not specified but a suggestion is: A 100–150, B 500–600, C 250–400, D 500–650, E 150–200. Total 1,500–2,000.
<b>How many marks is it worth?</b>	It is marked out of 20 for both HL and SL and weighted at 20% (for HL) and 25% (for SL) of the final assessment.
<b>When is it done?</b>	Timing is up to the teacher, but it is advisable to start the investigation at least three months before the date that samples for the May and November sessions have to be with the moderators.
<b>What can it be about?</b>	Any genuine historical topic, but the teacher must agree it with the student.
<b>What should the teacher do?</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Explain how the internal assessment works. Students should be given a copy of the instructions for the historical investigation from the “Internal Assessment” section of the guide.</li><li>2. Set a timetable for the different stages, for example, choosing the topic, first draft, final version.</li><li>3. Discuss topics and the availability of sources.</li><li>4. Agree topics; some teachers institute a specific programme of coordinated syllabus topics, others allow “free choice”.</li><li>5. Give class lessons on how to tackle the exercise, emphasizing in particular the importance of a well-defined thesis question, the use and evaluation of sources, note taking, analysis, and the preferred system for references and the bibliography.</li><li>6. Advise the students individually if and when necessary.</li><li>7. Read the students’ first drafts and advise them how their work could be improved, but do not annotate the written draft heavily.</li><li>8. Check and advise about references and the bibliography.</li><li>9. Assess all internal assessment according to the criteria in the guide.</li><li>10. Complete the appropriate forms: 3/IA and 3/CS. Be sure to affirm that the internal assessment is the student’s own work in the relevant section.</li><li>11. Send samples to the IBO for external moderation.</li></ol>



# Frequently Asked Questions

- **Can the investigation be on a topic outside the IB Diploma Programme history syllabus?**

Yes, this is perfectly acceptable.

- **How many sources should be used in the investigation?**

Students should use as many as will produce an effective investigation. Two of these sources should be selected for evaluation (section C of the investigation).

- **Should the teacher comment on several drafts of the investigation?**

No; only the first one, which should not be heavily annotated or edited.

- **Is it possible to have historical investigations approved by IBCA before they are undertaken?**

This is not a requirement and is not regular practice, but guidance is available from IBCA if the validity of the investigation is in doubt.

- **Is a penalty imposed when students do not follow the recommendations on the length of the investigation?**

No marks will be awarded for criterion F if the investigation is shorter than 1,500 or longer than 2,000 words. The word limit has been imposed in order to focus the student's investigation, to ensure fairness for all students and to reduce the overload on teachers and students.

- **Should the teacher write comments on the finished investigation?**

This is not a requirement but comments can be very helpful to the moderator in understanding how marks have been allocated.

- **Should the teacher make a copy of the student's investigation?**

Yes, this is advisable. After the process of moderation, the investigations are kept for several months by the moderator and then destroyed. The student and teacher may therefore like to keep a record of the finished investigation.

- **What do I do if I suspect that the student's work is not their own?**

If you have reasonable evidence that this is the case, make the student rewrite his or her investigation. If time does not permit this, then do not sign the form and submit the reasons for your suspicion.

# The Historical Investigation: Guidance for Students

Teachers may find that it is useful to photocopy this page and the section entitled “The Written Account” to give to students.

## Planning

1. Start by identifying a general area of interest.
2. Narrow it down to a specific question/area of investigation.
3. Choose a working title that may be changed/refined at a later stage.
4. Make sure you can obtain sufficient resources for your planned investigation.
5. Read widely around the area of study and note down resources used.
6. Review your thesis question and refine it if necessary.
7. Take notes from your chosen resources, including exact references.
8. Complete section A (the plan) and show it to your teacher.
9. Re-read your notes and decide where they would fit into the sections of the investigation.
10. Complete your investigation, according to the IBO guidelines.

On completion of the investigation, you may find it useful to use the following checklist.

Checklist	Completed
Does the front cover have your name, candidate number, word count and thesis question/statement?	
Are all the pages numbered?	
Have you completed all the sections of the historical investigation?	
A: Plan of the investigation	
B: Summary of evidence	
C: Evaluation of sources	
D: Analysis	
E: Conclusion	
F: List of sources	
Does your bibliography contain all the sources used?	
Is your bibliography set out in alphabetical order?	
Is your investigation within the word limit of 1,500–2,000?	

# The Written Account

This section is taken from the *History* guide (February 2001), but includes further guidance on producing the written account of the historical investigation.

Regardless of the type of historical investigation chosen, every student **must** produce a written account consisting of the following six sections:

- A Plan of the investigation
- B Summary of evidence
- C Evaluation of sources
- D Analysis
- E Conclusion
- F List of sources

## **A Plan of the investigation**

The plan of the investigation should include:

- the subject of the investigation, which may be formulated as a question
- the methods to be used in the investigation.

*This is a relatively brief but important section. A sharply focused question and a clearly structured plan will be more likely to produce a successful investigation.*

## **B Summary of evidence**

The summary of evidence should indicate what the student has found out from the sources he or she has used. It can be in the form of either a list or continuous prose. Any illustrations, documents, or other relevant evidence should be included in an appendix and will not be included in the word count.

*This section should be organized and referenced and provide evidence of thorough research.*

## **C Evaluation of sources**

This section of the written account should be a critical evaluation of two important sources appropriate to the investigation and should refer to their origin, purpose, value and limitation. More than two sources may be evaluated but the emphasis should be on the thorough evaluation of two sources rather than a superficial evaluation of a greater number.

*The two sources chosen should be appropriate for the investigation and could, for example, be written, oral or archeological. The purpose of this section is to assess the usefulness of the sources but not to describe their content or nature.*

## **D Analysis**

The analysis should include:

- the importance of the investigation in its historical context
- analysis of the evidence
- if appropriate, different interpretations.

*In this section the elements of the investigation identified in section B will be broken down into key issues/points. Consideration of historical context can add weight and perspective to the study. Where appropriate (depending on the scope of the investigation) links can be made with associated events and developments to aid understanding of the historical importance of the chosen investigation.*

## **E Conclusion**

The conclusion must be clearly stated and consistent with the evidence presented.

*This section is a follow-up to section D. It requires an answer or conclusion, based on the evidence presented, which either partially or fully addresses the question stated or implied in the investigation.*

## **F List of sources**

A bibliography or list of sources must be included although this will not form part of the word count.

*All sources, whether written or otherwise (including interviews), should be listed. A recognized method of listing sources must be used consistently throughout the investigation, for example, the Harvard author–date system. It is recommended that written sources be listed separately from non-written sources, for example, web addresses, oral interviews.*

**Total: 1,500–2,000 words, 20 marks**

# Outlines for the Historical Investigation

These four outlines illustrate some possible approaches to the historical investigation.

## 1. An investigation into social history

### How successfully did Hitler promote the ideal of the family in the Third Reich?

#### A Plan of the investigation

To establish what Hitler's ideal for the family was.  
To measure how far his vision accorded with reality.

#### B Summary of evidence

Background: position of family/women prior to 1933.  
Duties of women defined as: *children, church, kitchen* (*kinder, kirche, küche*).  
Hitler's ideals: *Mein Kampf* and other contemporary sources, for example, speeches.  
Evaluation of evidence: historians of social history of Third Reich.

#### C Evaluation of sources

Comparison of two historical studies, for example, Crew, D F. 1994. *Nazism and German Society 1933–1945*. Routledge; Noakes, J and Pridham, G. 1984. *Nazism 1919–1945, Vol 2. State, Economy & Society 1933–39*. University of Exeter.

#### D Analysis

The place of family in Nazi ideology.  
Role of men: penalties on bachelors.  
Ideal of women as mothers/wives/employees as promoted by Hitler and Goebbels.  
Reality of women's position: *Lebensborn* (homes for unmarried mothers); employment patterns—demands of war and rearmament.

#### E Conclusion

Evaluation of myth of German family as measured against evidence of family life from social history studies. Discussion of pressures/outside influences that undermined family policy.

## **2. An investigation of an event represented in newspaper reports**

**How did newspaper reports on the death of Kennedy vary, and how reliable were they?**

### **A Plan of the investigation**

To show how the reports of Kennedy's assassination reflected the impact of the event on America. To demonstrate how reporting changed with the passage of time.

### **B Summary of evidence**

Sections on Kennedy and on assassination.  
Immediate reactions of the press.  
Subsequent press reports.

### **C Evaluation of sources**

Evaluation of major newspaper reports, such as in the *Washington Post* and *The Times* (London).  
Either compare contemporary accounts or show how treatment of Kennedy's assassination changed over time in one newspaper.

### **D Analysis**

Importance of context.  
Tone of early reportage and analysis of reasons for it.  
How newspaper reporting changed with emerging evidence and changing mood of country.

### **E Conclusion**

Accuracy and effectiveness of reporting.  
Discussion of newspapers as sources of historical evidence.

### **3. An investigation comparing a film and a written account of a historical event**

**How and why did the accounts of the storming of the Winter Palace in October 1917 differ in the film, *October*, and in the book, *A People's Tragedy, The Russian Revolution 1891–1924*?**

#### **A Plan of the investigation**

To study the film *October* and compare it with a historical study of the storming of the Winter Palace.

#### **B Summary of evidence**

Film footage: *October*, 1927, directed by Eisenstein (account of storming of Winter Palace)—emphasis on symbols.

Written account: Figes, O. 1996. *A People's Tragedy, The Russian Revolution 1891–1924*. Pimlico.

Details of evidence: discussion of significance.

#### **C Evaluation of sources**

Eisenstein's *October*: functions—propaganda, creation of a myth.

Historical focus of *A People's Tragedy, The Russian Revolution 1891–1924*.

#### **D Analysis**

Myth of revolutionary uprising—spontaneous or not?

Function of film—giving confidence and pride to an emerging Russian state.

Focus of historian—overall evaluation.

#### **E Conclusion**

Contrast between the two sources.

Analysis of revolutionary myth.

Evaluation of sources and evidence as presented, for example, propaganda, western historian's view.

## **4. An investigation into local history**

**How, when and why was the church/mosque/temple of [name] built and what can be learnt from it about the village of [name] in a defined period?**

### **A Plan of the investigation**

To establish how, when and why the church/mosque/temple was built, its contribution to village/town life and what can be learnt from it about the life of the people of [name].

### **B Summary of evidence**

How: building methods, style, architecture.

When: chronology, origin and changes.

Why: religious motives, social status, demographic context.

History of and from it: demographic changes, religious changes, social implications, war damage, plague (graveyards).

### **C Evaluation of sources**

Buildings and artifacts: the church/mosque/temple and its religious “furniture”.

Written sources: parish/local records.

### **D Analysis**

Religious practices, changes, beliefs.

Impact of political change/revolutions.

Rise and fall in the economic status of the area.

War and plague that hit the area.

Art and architecture.

### **E Conclusion**

The church/mosque/temple as a historic monument or a living record.

(Buildings such as castles, forts, industrial buildings, bridges, poor houses (unions), could be treated in the same way.)



# The Historical Investigation: Assessed Examples

## **Example 1: How significant was Fidel Castro's role in the Missile Crisis of 1962?**

### Table of Contents

A. Plan of Investigation .....	1
B. Summary of Evidence .....	1-3
C. Evaluation of Sources .....	4-5
D. Analysis .....	5-7
E. Conclusion .....	7
F. Bibliography.....	8

## How Significant was Fidel Castro's Role in the Missile Crisis of 1962?

### A. Plan of Investigation

The investigation assesses the significance of Fidel Castro in the Missile Crisis of 1962. In order to evaluate Castro's significance, the investigation evaluates his role in each stage of the Crisis in reference to other participants of the event; Castro's role is investigated in the initial days of the Crisis, during the shooting down of the American U-2 plane, and in the resolution of the Crisis. Memoirs and oral history are mostly used to evaluate Castro's significance. Two of the sources used in the essay, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse* compiled by James Blight, Allyn Bruce and David Welsh and Cuban documents, "The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: the Cuban Version," are then evaluated for their origins, purposes, values and limitations.

The investigation does not assess the difference in ideologies (communist versus imperialism or capitalism) of the nations involved nor does the investigation assess opinions other than those of United States, Soviet Union, and Cuba.

### B. Summary of Evidence

Prior to the Missile Crisis, Castro-American relationships were already strained by the Bay of Pigs in 1961 in which American funded counterrevolutionary Cubans to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro.<sup>1</sup> The counterrevolutionary failed, pushing Castro into an alliance with communist Soviet Union and leaving Castro wary of American designs in Cuba.<sup>2</sup> Castro's fears were confirmed in early 1962 when his intelligence service noticed signs of U.S. activities related to what was later uncovered to be Operation Mongoose, another American invasion to overthrow Castro.<sup>3</sup> Thus, "it was under these circumstances that [Cuban officials]

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<sup>1</sup> Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes*. Trans and ed. Jerrold L. Schechter with Yacheslav V. Luchkov. (Boston: Little Brown, 1990) 171.

<sup>2</sup> Philip Brenner and James G. Blight, "The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro's Secret 1968 Speech," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*. No. 5 (Spring 1995).

<sup>3</sup> James G. Blight et al. *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse*. (New York: Pantheon, 1993) 19.

informed the Soviet Union that [they] were concerned about a direct invasion of Cuba by the United States and that [they] were thinking about how to step up [their] country's ability to resist an attack".<sup>4</sup> In response, Soviet President Khrushchev conceived the plan of protecting Cuban sovereignty by "installing missile with nuclear warheads in Cuba without letting the United States find out until it was too late do anything about them."<sup>5</sup> Castro accepted Khrushchev's proposal<sup>6</sup> and the Soviet Union began deploying nuclear arms.

For America, the Crisis began in mid October 1962 when American intelligence discovered Russian nuclear missile in Cuba. For most of the world, the Crisis began on 22 October 1962 when American President Kennedy revealed in a televised broadcast that U.S. "surveillance of the Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba" had uncovered "as series of offensive missile sites" in preparation for no other purpose "than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere."<sup>7</sup> After Kennedy's broadcast, the American President called for a naval blockade of Cuba<sup>8</sup> and used diplomatic negotiations with Khrushchev to come to an agreement in the removal of the weapons. During negotiations, several incidents occurred which heightened tensions and seemed to bring the world one step closer to nuclear holocaust. One of the incidents is the shooting down of the U.S. U-2 airplane on 27 October 1962 causing the death of Major Rudolf Anderson Jr.<sup>9</sup> At the time the United States and the Soviet Union believed that it was Castro who ordered Cuban antiaircraft artillery to fire at low-flying U.S. planes on the morning of 27 October.<sup>10</sup> After further analysis, it is clear that it was a Soviet soldier, not Cuban, who shot the plane. Although Castro ordered Cuban antiaircraft artillery to fire, there is no evidence that he ordered Soviet

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<sup>4</sup> Blight, 19.

<sup>5</sup> Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers. Ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott. (Boston: Little Brown, 1970) 493.

<sup>6</sup> Khrushchev, Glasnost. 171.

<sup>7</sup> Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994) 1.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 28.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 66.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 67.

artillery to fire. Instead, what is most likely to have happened was that the Soviet officers in Cuba identified so closely with the Cuban government's cause that their field commander gave the order to shoot at the U-2, thinking as an ally supporting comrades in war.<sup>11</sup> Another incident is Castro's letter to Khrushchev recommending that the Soviet Union should launch a first-strike nuclear attack on the United States.<sup>12</sup> This outlandish recommendation shocked Khrushchev, leaving him with the impression that Castro "was a young and hotheaded man" one who was "inexperienced as a statesman."<sup>13</sup>

The Crisis drew to a close when both great powers found a mutual solution outlined in a message sent by Khrushchev on 26 October 1962, and in Kennedy's response of 27 October; the two men agreed that if the Soviets would withdraw their offensive weapons from Cuba under United Nations supervision, the U.S. would remove its naval blockade of the island and pledge not to invade Cuba.<sup>14</sup> The Crisis came to an end on 28 October 1962 when Radio Moscow announced Khrushchev's "new order to dismantle the weapons... and to crate them and return them to the Soviet Union."<sup>15</sup> Throughout the negotiation period, neither Castro nor a Cuban representative took part, leaving the issue to be "entirely one between the United States and the Soviet Union."<sup>16</sup> So, Khrushchev's announcement on the radio not only shocked Castro but also humiliated him for his exclusion from the negotiations.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Blight, xi.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 474-491.

<sup>13</sup> Khrushchev, Glasnost. 178.

<sup>14</sup> Wayne S. Smith, The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since 1957. (New York: Norton, 1987) 81.

<sup>15</sup> Blight, 472.

<sup>16</sup> Philip W. Bonsal, Cuba, Castro and the United States. (London: U of Pittsburgh P, 1971) 187.

<sup>17</sup> "The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: The Cuban Version," Cold War International History Project Bulletin. Nos. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997)

### C. Evaluation of Sources

*Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse* compiled by James G. Blight, Allyn J. Bruce and David A. Welsh is an in-depth “report” on the Havana conference in 1992 hosted by Castro to discuss Cuba’s specific role during the Crisis. *Cuba on the Brink* was written with the purpose to “greatly enlarge the number of ‘participants’ in the Havana conference by supplying context sufficient for our readers to ‘be there’ vicariously.”<sup>18</sup> The book’s value lies in the fact that it provides a new Cuban perspective on the Crisis that has often been disregarded. As well, since Castro hosted the conference, the reader is exposed to Castro’s own interpretation and evaluation of Cuba’s significance. Its limitation is that the Havana conference is dependent on “critical oral history<sup>19</sup>”; considering that the conference occurred thirty years after the Crisis, it is doubtful that the recollections of the veteran participants have not been altered either subconsciously or for the purpose of conforming to political pressures.

Whereas *Cuba on the Brink* is based on discussion thirty years after the Crisis, “The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: the Cuban Version” is a record of conversations between Castro and Soviet envoy Mikoyan in the immediate aftermath of Khrushchev’s acceptance of Kennedy’s demand that Soviet nuclear missiles be withdrawn from Cuba. These conversations, which occurred on 4-5 November 1962, were obtained from Philip Brenner, Cuba specialist, who provided them to the Cold War International History Project and were translated from Spanish by Carlos Osorio. Cuba’s release of these documents provide a valuable source since these records are primary documents recorded immediately after the event and expose the hurt and betrayal felt by Castro over Khrushchev’s decision to withdraw. As well, since this is a conversation between a Soviet and a Cuban, the historian can notice the different interpretations of each country. These Cuban documents are limited as they were translated awkwardly and both documents are transcriptions of memo notes taken during a speech and do not seem to have been corrected. However, these Cuban documents can be compared against the Russian version of the Mikoyan-Castro Talks released prior to the Cuban version. Thus, assuming that both versions are independent from one another, the historian can compare the versions to one another for accuracy and biases.

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<sup>18</sup> Blight, 10.

<sup>19</sup> Critical oral history is the synthesis of recollections of participants with declassified documentation and the analyses of historians.

#### D. Analysis

Castro's significance in the Crisis can either justify or discredit American interference in Cuban internal affairs. Prior to the event, the international society was willing to accept American attempts to overthrow Castro since Americans were portrayed as heroes while Castro seemed to be a fanatical socialist.<sup>20</sup> But, if Castro was merely a pawn between U.S. and Soviet Union, Castro improves his international reputation making it difficult for future "heroic" American interference in Cuba.

In the initial days, Castro's role seems to be significant for two reasons: one, he consented to Khrushchev's plan and two; nuclear arms were sent for the sole interest of preserving Castro's socialist regime. However, Castro's role may be more limited since it is unlikely that Khrushchev's missiles were sent solely to protect Cuba. It is more likely that Khrushchev wanted to equalize the "balance of power" and redress the strategic imbalance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Before the Crisis, the American had surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases in Turkey<sup>21</sup>; sending missiles to Cuba would give the United States "a little of their own medicine...it was high time America learned what it feels like to have her own land and her own people threatened."<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, Khrushchev's and Kennedy's secret deal later on in the Crisis that Khrushchev would remove missiles from Cuba if Kennedy would remove Jupiters from Turkey give credibility to the possibility that despite Khrushchev's altruistic claims, it is more plausible that his actions of 1962 were reflective of the Soviet Union's own interests rather than Castro's.

During late October 1962, Castro's role is often directly related to the shooting down of the U.S. U-2 airplane. Khrushchev blames Castro, writing, "Castro ordered our anti-aircraft

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<sup>20</sup> Blight, 178,

<sup>21</sup> Anatoli, 11.

<sup>22</sup> Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers. 494.

officers to shoot down a U-2 reconnaissance plane.”<sup>23</sup> If Khrushchev’s claim is true, then Castro played a significant role in the Crisis since the shooting down anticipated the end of diplomatic U.S. negotiations and the start of nuclear warfare. Yet, since new evidence indicate that is it more likely that Soviet officers shot down the plane without Castro’s orders, Castro should neither be blamed nor be given significance for the shooting down of the U-2 plane. As well, Castro’s role is also associated with his recommendation that the Soviet should launch a nuclear attack on the United States. Actually, Castro’s apparent eagerness for nuclear war may be his greatest significance in the Crisis since his willingness to use aggression ironically convinced Khrushchev of the importance of maintaining world peace and contributed to the Soviet decision to yield to the United States.<sup>24</sup>

Overall, the clearest indication of Castro’s importance to the Crisis lies in his lack of participation in the Soviet-American negotiations. Castro did not realize that Khrushchev had conceded to remove all soviet offensive weapons from Cuba until he heard Khrushchev’s announcement on the radio. His exclusion from the negotiations was no error on the Soviet-American’s behalf, but a sign of his political insignificance in the Crisis.

For many U.S. government decision makers at the time of the crisis most have agreed that Cuba was just a locale for a U.S.- Soviet confrontation. Ex U.S. Ambassador to Cuba (1959-60) Philip W. Bonsal declares that the Missile Crisis cannot truly be classified under Cuban American relation since “the issue was entirely one between the United States and the Soviet Union.”<sup>25</sup> He states that although the confrontation could have eliminated Castro, “the exercise had little to do with him.”<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Khrushchev, Glasnost. 178,

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 177.

<sup>25</sup> Bonsal, 187.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

On the other hand, Khrushchev writes in his memoirs that Castro did indeed play a significant role in the Crisis. He bluntly announces that Castro was solely responsible for the shooting of the U-2 plane<sup>27</sup> and that Castro encouraged the Soviet Union to “launch a preemptive strike against the United States.”<sup>28</sup> However, in view of contradicting sources and Khrushchev’s tendency to make declarations without details and factual evidence, it is unlikely that Castro’s role was as significant as claimed.

#### E. Conclusion

During each and every stage of the Crisis, Castro’s role is overshadowed by that of the Soviet Union’s and the United States. In the beginning, it was Khrushchev, not Castro, who initiated the deployment of nuclear arms; and Castro’s relation with the U-2 shooting is little more than a misunderstanding on the part of the Soviet soldiers. As argued by Bonsal, the Missile Crisis was entirely between the Soviet Union and the United States. This view can be justified when we consider the possibility that Khrushchev may have sent his missiles for reasons other than for Castro’s defense and when we are faced with Castro’s obvious exclusion from the Crisis negotiations. Castro’s “role” in the Crisis, if he has one at all, is that he unintentionally helped convinced Khrushchev to concede to Kennedy’s demands. As Castro himself declares, “I cannot take the credit for the resolution of the crisis...the major role belongs to Khrushchev who caused that crisis by his stubbornness, and then resolved it.”<sup>29</sup>

Word Count: 1989

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<sup>27</sup> Khrushchev, Glasnost, 178.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 177.

<sup>29</sup> Georgy Shakhnazarov, “Fidel Castro, Glasnost, and the Caribbean Crisis,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. No. 5 (Spring 1995).



## F. Bibliography

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## Assessment criteria

Criterion	Total marks	Marks achieved	Examiner comments
<b>A</b>	2	2	Clearly stated plan that focuses closely on the question. Methodology explained and in addition clear boundaries set in final sentence.
<b>B</b>	5	5	Well researched with constant reference to the extent of Castro's participation. Thoroughly supported from a good range of appropriate sources.
<b>C</b>	4	4	Good choice of sources: one contemporary and one secondary. Very clear comments on value and limitations of both. Could be slightly more focused on purpose of Mikoyan-Castro talks, but still thorough enough for full marks.
<b>D</b>	5	4	Castro's role is constantly analysed with reference to both sources and the sequence of events. However, more critical analysis of the evidence is needed for full marks.
<b>E</b>	2	2	The conclusion focuses on Castro's role and makes a clear judgment.
<b>F</b>	2	2	Extensive, clearly standardized bibliography. Investigation within the word limit, very clearly written.
<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>19</b>	An excellent investigation of a popular topic. Only one mark taken off for D, where it was felt greater depth was required for full marks.

**Example 2: To what extent do the film, *The Charge of the Light Brigade*, and the book, *The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*, agree on the apportioning of blame for the failure of the charge of the Light Brigade?**

~ Contents ~

Page:	Section:
1	A: Plan of the Investigation
2	B: Summary of Evidence
3	C: Evaluation of Sources
4	D: Analysis
5	E: Conclusion
6	F: List of Sources
7	Endnotes

**A: Plan of the Investigation**

**To what extent do the film, “The Charge of the Light Brigade” and the book, “The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost” agree on the apportioning of blame for the failure of the Charge of the Light Brigade?**

The charge of the Light Brigade occurred on 25<sup>th</sup> October, 1854, during the siege of Sebastopol. It lasted seven minutes and 247 men and 497 horses were lost. There were four men responsible for the chain of actions that led to the charge; Lord Raglan, Captain Nolan, Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan.

The aim of this investigation is to compare the apportioning of blame on the different officers in both the 1968 film and according to the view of the historian, Mark Adkin, published in 2000. The investigation will look at the actions of the four men that led to the events of 25<sup>th</sup> October 1854. An analysis of this should indicate the extent to which the sources agree on the apportioning of blame for the failure of the charge.

## B: Summary of Evidence

### 1. The situation in the Crimea

The Crimean War began on 23<sup>rd</sup> October, 1853 when Russia rejected an ultimatum from Turkey to withdraw her troops from Turkish Moldavia. The ‘balance of power’ in Europe was being threatened so, on 27<sup>th</sup> March 1854, Britain and France became military allies with an attack on Russia in the Crimea. For the first time in 200 years, “British and French soldiers were to stand together shooting at a common foe rather than at each other”<sup>i</sup>.

### 2. The Charge

The line-up of the Light Brigade on the morning of the charge was “five regiments of light cavalry, with a combined strength of some 664 all ranks”<sup>ii</sup>. Lord Raglan issued the order to the Light Brigade, Captain Nolan delivered it, Lord Lucan received it and Lord Cardigan executed it.

The cavalry received four orders from Raglan on that morning.

The third order, to Lord Lucan, “was a masterpiece of imprecision and obscurity”<sup>iii</sup>. “*Cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. They will be supported by the infantry which have been ordered to advance on two fronts*”<sup>iv</sup>

However, Lucan could not see the enemy from his position. Lucan then waited. He later said that this was not any sign of disobeying the order but rather he was waiting for the promised infantry. Raglan grew impatient as he could see the Russians removing the guns from the redoubts on the heights without obstruction, “the chance of recapturing the guns was likely to be lost for ever”<sup>v</sup>.

He asked General Airey to write the fourth order,

*“Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front – follow the enemy and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns – Troop Horse Artillery may accompany – French cavalry is on your left –*

R. Airey”<sup>vi</sup>

Raglan read the order and scrawled the word “immediate” at the end. Captain Nolan took the order to the waiting cavalry. Nolan, being Airey’s aide-de-camp, should have been well informed of the meaning of the order. An officer, Calthorpe, who was there when Nolan was given the order later wrote that Nolan “received careful instructions from both Lord Raglan and the Quartermaster-General”<sup>vii</sup>. Lucan was indeed “confused, “His Commander-in-Chief had sent him a written order that he did not properly understand and that appeared to contradict the accepted norms of cavalry warfare”<sup>viii</sup>. Lucan did not understand to which guns he was supposed to advance as the only ones he could see were at the end of the valley. When he asked Nolan for clarification, the captain pointed to the North Valley and said, “There, my Lord, is the enemy and there are your guns”<sup>ix</sup>. The nature of Nolan’s answer and the use of “advance rapidly”<sup>x</sup> and “immediate”<sup>xi</sup> in the order left Lucan no choice but to obey and thus the Light Brigade charged down the wrong valley, surrounded by guns on all sides.

The film and Adkin’s view on these events are very similar.

## C: Evaluation of Sources

Two of the sources used were:

**Adkin, Mark, “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Pimlico, London, 2000.**

The author writes in the introduction to his work that, “the object of this book is to put the reader as nearly as possible in the saddles of those responsible for issuing the orders that set the charge in motion, and of the participants themselves”<sup>xii</sup>. The use of battlefield sketches to give an image of the exact view that Raglan could see help to fulfil Adkin’s aim and were useful. The breadth in the book was also useful – following the recriminations and accusations that continued for years afterwards. This book had few limitations in terms of this investigation. Although sections on disease in the Crimea were not as necessary as the background information on the “four horsemen of calamity”<sup>xiii</sup> they helped create a more rounded image of what the war was like.

**Film: “*The Charge of the Light Brigade*”. Directed by Tony Richardson. Written by Charles Wood. UK, 1968.**

The film’s script was strongly based on Cecil Woodham-Smith’s book, “The Reason Why”. It takes from this source a similarly anti-privilege line. Captain Nolan is made to be the film’s hero by having risen through the ranks on “talent not connection”<sup>xiv</sup>. The film was useful for its portrayal of the characters of the four key officers. Dr. Saul David wrote in his review that Cardigan “could easily have abused one officer, as he does in this film, with the words: “Paymaster? That’s not a rank it’s a trade!”<sup>xv</sup>. It was also useful as the depiction of the charge, unlike other events, was recreated almost exactly as it happened. This served to make understandable the difficulty in which Lucan was placed by the lack of clarity in Raglan’s orders given his position and what he could see. The limitations of this source are in part the historical inaccuracies (although these were mainly in the back ground to the charge rather than the events leading directly to it) and also that the film ends immediately after the charge. It therefore does not comment on the recriminations that swiftly followed which would have helped this investigation be more accurate in judging the apportioning of blame in the film.

## D: Analysis

Both Adkin and the film place most of the blame on Nolan with Raglan being the next most responsible. Adkin writes, “Nolan who so scornfully and in all probability deliberately pointed out the wrong objective, must take a large portion of the blame for the charge taking place”<sup>xxvi</sup>. He also comments on the fact that the words “attack” and “charge” do not appear on the fourth order. Raglan “a the very last moment and not appreciating the damage it would do, then told Nolan verbally that Lucan was to “attack immediately”<sup>xxvii</sup>. Adkin’s view is that it was this that sealed the fate of the Light Brigade. The recriminations that followed the charge focused not so much on the exact content of the orders, not even about whether or not they were understood, “but rather about whether, in the circumstances, Lucan had any choice but to follow Nolan’s verbal order rather than Raglan’s written one”<sup>xxviii</sup>. Raglan had made a spur of the moment decision – his order took no account of the fact that the recipient of his message could not see all that Raglan could and his orders were unclear. For this, Adkin makes him take substantial blame. The film, portraying Raglan as a man not entirely in control of the situation, a “semi-senile blunderer”<sup>ix</sup> leaves him in a slightly more positive light. Although these mistakes on Raglan’s part are made clear in the film, the fact that the final order that leads to the charge came from Nolan, verbally, and not Raglan, means that in both the film and in Adkin’s view, Nolan bears the brunt of responsibility. Adkin writes, “Nolan launched the Light Brigade down the North Valley knowing it was not Raglan’s intention. He must therefore take the bulk of the blame for its loss”<sup>xx</sup>. However, it is important to note that in the film, Nolan rides forward after the charge has begun, shouting and waving his sword. This suggests to the audience that he has realised his mistake. He is killed shortly following this. This shows that the film places blame on Nolan but he is still viewed sympathetically by the audience as he tried to stop the charge. This is in-line with Cecil Woodham-Smith’s account in “The Reason Why”. She accounts for his mistake by saying that “when he received the fourth order he was almost off his head with excitement and impatience, and he misread it”<sup>xxi</sup>. Peter Gibbs does not agree with the idea that it is Nolan who should take most of the blame, “To suggest that (Nolan)...determined to engineer an action which had not been ordered by the commander-in chief...and that he accomplished this extraordinary purpose by a vague gesture of his arm, is pure sophism”<sup>xxii</sup>.

Both sources give far less blame to Cardigan and Lucan than they do Raglan and Nolan. Adkin’s view is that Lucan has been unfairly judged by Raglan and historians to date. He comments that since, when he did not understand the orders, he questioned Nolan as to what to do and was given an answer upon which he acted, he can only take a small share of the responsibility. The film also shows that the charge was against Lucan’s better judgement and clearly shows Nolan pointing to the wrong valley thus placing more blame on Nolan than Lucan. As Cecil Woodham-Smith wrote, “Had Lord Lucan refused to execute and order brought by a member of the Headquarters staff. . .he would, in his own words, have had no choice but “to blow his brains out”<sup>xxiii</sup>. Cardigan, who executed the order, in Adkin’s view “did at brigade level what Lucan had just done at divisional – queried an apparently dubious order and been told to implement it at once”<sup>xxiv</sup>. The film shows him querying the order with Lucan but neither had the power, the time or the inclination to question it further.

## **E: Conclusion**

The film and Adkin seem to agree for the most part on the amount of blame placed on each of the officers. To Raglan, from his position, his orders made sense. This is demonstrated in both sources. However, Nolan, who delivered the order, added the word “attack” and pointed to the wrong valley. It is he who is made to take the most responsibility in both sources. Raglan’s character in the film, however, means the lasting image is of his incompetence and due to the amount of time Nolan’s character is given in the film, the audience is more sympathetic to him than readers of Adkin’s book would be. Cardigan and Lucan take less responsibility in both sources – they were following orders. However, in both Adkin’s view and in the film, their personal grievances meant that rational conversation between the two when discussing the order was impossible. The film does not go on to cover the recriminations that followed and all the officers are left in a negative light - it is the loss of life of the ordinary soldiers that is the lasting image. Adkin however, who goes on to discuss the events following the charge leaves Lucan in a slightly more favourable light due to, in Adkin’s view, the unfairness of his dismissal.

In conclusion, the sources largely agree with the apportioning of blame for the failure of the charge, however the fact that the film does not discuss the recriminations that followed and that Adkin’s work does means that the lasting image of the four officers is slightly different.

1,971 WORDS



**F: List of Sources****Books:**

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Tennyson, Alfred Lord, "*The Charge of the Light Brigade*"

**Videos:**

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Documentary: Campaigns in History series. "*Balaclava: 1854 The Thin Red Line and The Charge of the Light Brigade*". Directed by Graham Holloway. 1993

With accompanying book: extracts from "Letters from Headquarters" by Lt.Col.S.J.G.Calthorpe

**Web-sites:**

[www.national-army-museum.ac.uk/pages/crimean.html](http://www.national-army-museum.ac.uk/pages/crimean.html)

[www.britishempire.co.uk/forces/armyunits/britishcavalry/17thlancerschargeltbrigade.html](http://www.britishempire.co.uk/forces/armyunits/britishcavalry/17thlancerschargeltbrigade.html).

[www.pinetreeweb.com/13th-balaclava2.html](http://www.pinetreeweb.com/13th-balaclava2.html)

[www.625.org.uk/biograph/biogwood.html](http://www.625.org.uk/biograph/biogwood.html) – A biography of Charles Wood

[www.channel4.com/history/microsites/H/history/heads/pastimperfect/brigade.html](http://www.channel4.com/history/microsites/H/history/heads/pastimperfect/brigade.html) – A review by the freelance military historian, Dr Saul David.

**End-notes:**

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- <sup>i</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 23
- <sup>ii</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 2
- <sup>iii</sup> Gibbs, Peter, “*Crimean Blunder*”. Page 209
- <sup>iv</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 121
- <sup>v</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 127
- <sup>vi</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 127
- <sup>vii</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 130
- <sup>viii</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 133
- <sup>ix</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 133 and the film “The Charge of the Light Brigade”
- <sup>x</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 134
- <sup>xi</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 134
- <sup>xii</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page xii
- <sup>xiii</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 21
- <sup>xiv</sup> [www.channel4.com/history/microsites/H/history/heads/pastimperfect/brigade.html](http://www.channel4.com/history/microsites/H/history/heads/pastimperfect/brigade.html)  
A review by the freelance military historian, Dr Saul David.
- <sup>xv</sup> [www.channel4.com/history/microsites/H/history/heads/pastimperfect/brigade.html](http://www.channel4.com/history/microsites/H/history/heads/pastimperfect/brigade.html)  
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- <sup>xvi</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 230
- <sup>xvii</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 231
- <sup>xviii</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 232
- <sup>xix</sup> [www.channel4.com/history/microsites/H/history/heads/pastimperfect/brigade.html](http://www.channel4.com/history/microsites/H/history/heads/pastimperfect/brigade.html)  
A review by the freelance military historian, Dr Saul David.
- <sup>xx</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 242
- <sup>xxi</sup> Woodham-Smith, Cecil, “*The Reason Why*”. Page 234
- <sup>xxii</sup> Gibbs, Peter, “*Crimean Blunder*”. Page 213
- <sup>xxiii</sup> Woodham-Smith, Cecil, “*The Reason Why*”. Page 235
- <sup>xxiv</sup> Adkin, Mark. “*The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost*”. Page 243

## Assessment criteria

Criterion	Total marks	Marks achieved	Examiner comments
<b>A</b>	2	2	Good, clear plan of the investigation and the methodology to be used.
<b>B</b>	5	5	Clear evidence of the sequence of events, supported by close reference to appropriate sources. If the citations had been put in the end notes in full, the additional words freed could have been used for further development of factual details.
<b>C</b>	4	3	Evaluation of sources could have been more critical, particularly in respect of limitations.
<b>D</b>	5	5	The analysis is clearly trying to distinguish where the sources apportion blame rather than narrating events.
<b>E</b>	2	2	Clear conclusion that answers the question; the conclusion indicates a high level of agreement between the film and the book.
<b>F</b>	2	1	Reasonable range of sources but not in alphabetical order. The investigation is written within the word limit.
<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>	An interesting investigation that effectively compares two alternative sources.

**Example 3: To what extent was the involvement of the United States government and the CIA responsible for the downfall of Salvador Allende?**

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C	Evaluation of Sources	5
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## **A Plan of Investigation**

*To what extent was the involvement of the United States government and the CIA responsible for the downfall of Salvador Allende?*

The aim of this investigation is to evaluate the degree to which American clandestine operations in Chile contributed to the downfall of that country's President, Salvador Allende, in 1973. The investigation focuses on the tactics used by the 40 Committee and CIA to keep Allende from gaining political power (1958-1970), and those used to destabilize his government after his election (1970-1973). The contribution of Allende's own political performance to his downfall is also considered. In the section entitled Evaluation of Sources, two sources used for this investigation [*Staff Report of the Select Committee to study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities: Covert Actions in Chile* and *The Lawless State: The Crimes of the US. Intelligence Agencies*] are evaluated according to their values, limitations, origins, and purposes.

## **B Summary of Evidence**

On September 11th, 1973, a coup d'état led by Augusto Pinochet overthrew the government of democratically elected President Salvador Allende. Chile's political history had until this time been mostly free of violent upheaval. The country's democratic tradition dated back to 1818 "with only three brief exceptions, the last in 1932."<sup>1</sup> The exception to the Latin American 'rule' of political turmoil, Chile's political stability was considerably greater than that of its neighbours.

The 40 Committee, set up to control American secret action around the world, directed the offensives against the Allende government: with authorization from the Committee, the CIA was able to carry out extensive covert action in Chile. (It is important

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<sup>1</sup> Morton Halperin et. al. *The Lawless State: Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies* (New York: Penguin Books, 1976) 15.

to keep in mind that the legislative branches of government, and thus the American people, were not aware of the actions of the Committee.) The operations against Allende were divided into two components: Track I consisted of employing constitutional methods to keep Allende from power; Track II

was initiated by President Nixon... when he instructed the CIA to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'état in Chile<sup>2</sup>

However, “the 40 Committee never discussed this direct CIA role [and]. . . the Agency was to report. . . to the White House.”<sup>3</sup>

As a part of Track I, for the 1964 Chilean presidential elections, during which the US supported Christian Democrat candidate Eduardo Frei, the CIA “mounted a massive anti-communism campaign. Extensive use was made of the [media]”<sup>4</sup> and included posters of “Soviet tanks and Cuban firing squads”<sup>5</sup>. The campaign was principally a religion-based scare tactic. It threatened “godless-atheist communism”<sup>6</sup> in the case of a Marxist win, but provided an alternative: that “[for this not to happen, we must elect Eduardo Frei as president”. Of course, the American government also funded the Christian Democratic Party. A subsequent CIA study concluded that Frei’s majority win was a direct result of thy campaign.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Staff Report of the Select Committee to study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, “Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.) 25. <<http://www.fas.org/lrp/ops/policy/church-chile.htm>> 15. [hereafter referred to as Senate Report]

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, 25-26.

<sup>4</sup> Senate Report, 15.

<sup>5</sup> William Blum. The CIA: A Forgotten History: US Global Interventions Since World War 2 (New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1986) 233.

<sup>6</sup> Blum, 233.

<sup>7</sup> Senate Report, 16.

The attempted kidnapping and eventual assassination of General René Schneider was a Track II tactic. Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Schneider “insisted the constitutional process be followed”<sup>8</sup> insofar as the army’s political affiliation was concerned. As he was the greatest obstacle to a military coup, the CIA assured “[t]hose Chileans inclined to stage a coup... of strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. government”<sup>9</sup> boldened by this promise, two attempts at kidnapping (supported by the CIA) were made by officers; Schneider was finally shot and killed in another botched attempt on October 22<sup>nd</sup>. It is inconclusive whether the weapons used in the assassination been provided by the CIA<sup>10</sup>.

Despite continuous efforts against him, Allende secured a plurality victory and officially became president on October 24<sup>th</sup>. In the US, a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) was held two weeks later<sup>11</sup>. It was recognized that an “economic squeeze” would put such strain on Chile that “economic troubles [would] generate [enough] public dissatisfaction”<sup>12</sup> to bring about Allende’s downfall. Nixon determined to give Chile “cold Turkey” on the economic front: as its economy was largely export-based, with copper accounting for 80 per cent of exports, it was decided that the US use its economic superiority to influence world copper prices to Chile’s disadvantage.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, between 1969 and 1970, total American economic aid to Chile dropped from 80.8 to 29.6 million dollars—a

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<sup>8</sup> Interim Report: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. <<http://history-matters.com/archive/churchreports/ir/contents.htm>> 225.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 227.

<sup>11</sup> Among those present were President Nixon, Vice President Ford, CIA Director Richard Helms, and the President’ Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger.

<sup>12</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, NSC Meeting - Chile (NSSM 97), November 6, 1970. 2.

<<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20001113/701106.pdf>> [hereafter referred to as NSC meeting]

<sup>13</sup> NSC meeting, 3.

change of 63 per cent; in 1972, it totalled a mere 7.4 million<sup>14</sup> (See Appendix A).

Furthermore, America also influenced the international community to “[deny]... credits to Chile”<sup>15</sup>.

During his brief time in power, Allende nationalized Chilean industry and established relations with numerous socialist countries<sup>16</sup>, as he had promised he would. He carried out economic reforms that (in the short term) were of benefit to Chile’s economy.<sup>17</sup> However, his rule was plagued by strikes of the mining and transportation sectors of the workforce. Still, American involvement was present here as well:

[many] leaders of... trade associations... received free training... from the American Institute for Free Labour... which. . . was set up under the control of the CIA. While the 40 Committee turned down specific CIA proposals for direct support of two truckers’ strikes... in 1972 and 1973... the CIA passed money onto private-sector-groups which, in turn, with the agency’s knowledge, funded the truckers.<sup>18</sup>

The Senate Report agrees that “the two... strikes could not have been maintained on the basis of union funds”<sup>19</sup> The Allende government never managed to put an end to the three month long truckers’ strike of 1973.

Finally, on September 11th, the long-awaited coup went as planned, and the will of Pinochet descended upon Chile.

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<sup>14</sup> Senate Report, 34.

<sup>15</sup> Halperin, 24.

<sup>16</sup> David R. Mares and Francisco Rojas Aravena. Coming in from the Cold: The United States and Chile. (New York: Routledge, 2001) 10.

<sup>17</sup> Salvatore Bizzaro. Historical Dictionary of Chile. (Metuchen, N.J. : Scarecrow Press, 1987) 24.

<sup>18</sup> Halperin, 25.

<sup>19</sup> Senate Report, 31.



## **C Evaluation of Sources**

*The Lawless State: The Crimes of the US. Intelligence Agencies*, written by Morton Halperin (et al) is a critical look at the misdeeds of the CIA, FBI, NSA, and IRS, devoting an entire chapter to the case against Allende. The purpose of the chapter is to clarify to the general public the involvement of the United States in the downfall of Allende. Its values lie in that its author was heavily involved in politics at the national level (in fact he was a senior staff member of the NSC), giving him a more intimate knowledge of the political system of which he writes. Also, as he is an American, he maintains a higher degree of understanding of the politics of his country. The major limitation of this work is that it was published in 1976, only three years into Pinochet's rule; thus it does not have the advantage of a greater historical context. Also, this was well before the October 2000 release of 9A records of covert operations in Chile.

*Covert Actions in Chile, 1963-19 73* is a report to the United States Senate of undercover actions in Chile. Its purpose was to make known to the Senate the extent of American involvement in Chilean affairs, especially those taken against Allende. The values of this document are that it is a primary source, and that it is a direct and concrete summary of actions in Chile. Limitations include the fact that, as it is a government publication of the wrongdoings of the government, it may have excluded information that was particularly incriminating. Also, it deals with top-secret information, some of which had not been ~ declassified by its 1975 publication.

## **D Analysis**

Salvador Allende was, as a politician, a prime target for American antagonism. His Marxism, something that, in the Cold War era of the 1970s, was synonymous with the

communism of Russia and Cuba, had doomed him from the start. Allende was, in a socialist, and as such was even considered moderate by other Chilean socialists.<sup>20</sup> The fact that Allende also established diplomatic relations with other socialist countries alarmed America, particularly as he was also a “personal friend”<sup>21</sup> of Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. This affiliation would have been a dangerous one at the best of times, but at the height of the Cold War, it was diplomatic suicide.

Allende further antagonised the United States by daring to assert his country’s economic independence, that is, by nationalizing Chilean industry, much of which had been owned by foreign (mainly American) companies. In particular, Chile’s copper industry was largely owned by American mining companies, and its nationalization was not favourable to American international commercial investments.<sup>22</sup>

Allende’s biggest offence, however, was that he was a committed democrat. The very fact that Allende had won 36.5 per cent of votes demonstrated that a Marxist had found favour in the eyes of a population, and that the massive American use of anti-socialism propaganda in Chile had not succeeded.

The American campaign in Chile did exactly what it had set out to do: it “ma[d]e [Chile’s] economy scream”.<sup>23</sup> Withholding financial aid wreaked havoc on the country’s fragile economy. It is interesting to note that, even as American monetary aid to Chile subsided,

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<sup>20</sup> Halperin, 16.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 28.

<sup>23</sup> John Jacob Nutter, Ph. D. The CIA’s Black Ops: Covert Action, Foreign Policy, and Democracy. (New York: Prometheus Books, 2000) 232.

its aid to the country's military increased.<sup>24</sup> This and the murder of General René Schneider contributed to Chile's traditionally apolitical military turning on the government it was expected to protect.

However, as much as Allende brought the wrath of the USA onto himself, he also brought upon himself the wrath of his own country. After the initial success of his economic policy of "consumption to stimulate... economy"<sup>25</sup> the year 1973 brought soaring inflation, "reaching 360 percent over the year"<sup>26</sup>. The government's inability to deal effectively with the miners' strike in 1972 and trucker's strike in 1973 showed Allende's party to be little more than political amateurs.

Perhaps his economic reforms came too swiftly for the fragile Chilean economy to support, destabilizing his own regime and making him lose favour in the eyes of the public. Even though he seemed popular, the very fact that army officers were plotting against him as early as October 1970 (before his formal inauguration!) casts doubts upon how long he would have remained president, even without American intervention against him. The very fact that miners and transportation officials went on strike so often demonstrates public dissatisfaction with Allende's regime.

Perhaps Fidel Castro was correct in stating that because "[e]veryone had the right to conspire... the result was that they overthrew Allende".<sup>27</sup> Perhaps in the very nature of the Chilean, democratic, path to socialism were sown the seeds of a military coup. After all, all

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<sup>24</sup> Senate Report, 34.

<sup>25</sup> Bizzaro, 24.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Halperin, 18.

states long established as socialist (USSR) or communist (China) did not gain this status through democratic means: why would it work any differently for Chile? Allende's vision of democracy and Marxism, completely antithetical institutions to the North American Cold War psyche, was perhaps too suddenly imposed on Chile and too much worked against to ever truly be possible. Allende was doomed to failure as soon as he chose to pursue Chilean socialism through a democratic path.

## **E Conclusion**

The statement that the United States was in no way, shape, or form involved in helping Pinochet gain power in 1973 is untrue. It is highly unlikely that a government that had spent three years and an enormous amount of money to destabilise Allende had nothing to do with a military coup for which they had been hoping for since 1970. America welcomed the new dictator, providing him in the first three years of rule with nearly thirteen times the direct economic aid given to Allende's government.<sup>28</sup> However, as the evidence of American implication in the coup is only circumstantial, it becomes necessary to consider Allende's own role in the coup. His policies failed miserably earning him the disfavour of his subjects.

It is not correct to say that it was solely American invasiveness and political aggression, or Allende's economic blunders that were responsible for his ultimate downfall. One would not have been caused sufficient problems without the other. With proper American and international financial aid, it is possible that Allende's reforms may have worked. Conversely, if Allende's changes had been implemented more gradually, American covert action may have

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<sup>28</sup> Mares and Aravena, 11.

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proven to be nothing more than an inconvenience. As it the two elements fed off each other, culminating in the rule of a fascist dictator, and years of terror imposed on the Chilean people, who were, after all, the innocent victims of the CIA, Allende, and finally Pinochet.

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
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*Appendix A*

Data Source: Staff Report of the Select Committee to study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, "Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973" Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. <<http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/policy/church-chile.htm>> 34.

## Assessment criteria

Criterion	Total marks	Marks achieved	Examiner comments
<b>A</b>	2	2	Clear plan that states the focus of the investigation. Two key areas are indicated. Sources to be evaluated are named.
<b>B</b>	5	4	Adequate research although initial paragraphs do not focus sufficiently on the question. Appropriate references and reasonable range of sources.
<b>C</b>	4	3	Stronger evaluation of the second source, where value and limitations are appropriately stated. Less effective with <i>The Lawless State</i> , where the comments on the value of the source are limited in scope.
<b>D</b>	5	3	Too much focus on Allende's politics rather than on the role of the CIA in the coup. Good attempt to analyse how Allende may have lost popularity.
<b>E</b>	2	2	A well-synthesized conclusion that responds to the question set and considers a number of factors leading to Allende's downfall.
<b>F</b>	2	2	Standard format for the bibliography. A reasonable range of sources. The investigation is written within the word limit.
<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>16</b>	A competent investigation with some gaps in evidence. Some lack of depth in evaluation and analysis, which led to a few marks being lost, but still good.

**Example 4: What were the real motives for the different views held by Churchill and Chamberlain during the years previous to World War II?**

*“Criticism is easy, achievement is difficult”.*  
Winston Churchill in “The Wicked Wit of Winston Churchill” by  
Dominique Enright.



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## **WHICH WERE THE REAL MOTIVES FOR THE DIFFERENT VIEWS HELD BY CHURCHILL AND CHAMBERLAIN, DURING THE YEARS PREVIOUS TO WORLD WAR II?**

### **A) PLAN OF INVESTIGATION**

In this investigation, my aim was to analyze the different views that Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill held regarding Hitler's aggression during the inter-war years. Although now, many years later, it is clear that Churchill's vision was accurate, the circumstances at that particular time help to understand Chamberlain's outlook better, instead of regarding him as a simple "appeaser".

My method of investigation consisted in comparing various opinions that historians have concerning both politicians. I took into account the authors' backgrounds, as well as the time when their books were written, in order to support my investigation with primary and secondary sources. I also did cross-referencing of recent sources with others published soon after the events, so as to analyze the issue in depth.

### **B) SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE**

Chamberlain (see Appendix 1), Britain's Prime Minister at the time the Second World War broke out, was confident that by satisfying Hitler's demands, war could be avoided. This is why he gave in to Hitler's ambitions, and practiced the policy now known as "appeasement" (See Appendix 2).

Churchill (see Appendix 3), however, believed that it was "impossible" to pursue a peaceful coexistence with Hitler's regime. He was opposed to the policy of appeasement because he warned, "*it would encourage Hitler to seize more territory*"<sup>1</sup>. He refused to make peace with Hitler on terms, since his "*brilliant intuition*"<sup>2</sup> told him from early on

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<sup>1</sup> Corbishley, Mike, John Gillingham, Rosemary Kelly, Ian Dawson, James Mason (1996), The Young Oxford History of Britain & Ireland. Oxford University Press, Great Britain. Page 365.

<sup>2</sup> Best Geoffrey (2001), Churchill: A Study in Greatness. Hambledon and London, Great Britain. Page 153.

<sup>3</sup> Idem.

that “*Hitler had much more in mind than the mere redress of the Versailles grievances*”<sup>3</sup>. His advice was ignored, though years later it proved to be correct.

A wide range of historians agree that the appeasement policy was “shameful” and immediately consider the guiltiest of all men, its author, Neville Chamberlain. For instance, **Graham Stewart**, the author of “**Burying Caesar**”, considers that Chamberlain during negotiations, “*demonstrated his inability to grasp the full measure of the man with whom he was dealing*”<sup>4</sup>. In other words, according to him, Chamberlain should have realized earlier that negotiating with Hitler was impossible, that, as Churchill stated, to give in to Hitler “*would only make him more and more aggressive*”<sup>5</sup>. This opinion is echoed in “**Britain in the Twentieth Century**”, when its authors state that Chamberlain “*genuinely believed that Hitler’s signature meant something, when there was abundant evidence that he had not even a rudimentary sense of honor*”<sup>6</sup>. However, this book shows a certain degree of bias, as it focuses mainly on Chamberlain’s weaknesses, and fails to consider the historical context that led Chamberlain to proceed as he did.

On this issue, historians argue that Chamberlain trusted Hitler because he desperately wanted to avoid a war, as the memory of the Great War was still fresh in British people’s minds (see Appendix 4). Furthermore, as historian **John Ray** says, “*some people admired Hitler because he was a sworn enemy of Communism and they feared Russia more than they mistrusted Germany*”<sup>7</sup>. This author helps one understand why Chamberlain was so confident that Hitler would carry out his promises.

Churchill is considered now, “*the prophet of uncomfortable truths*”<sup>8</sup>. Yet at the time the prospect of war, which was the “logical conclusion” to his arguments, along with his awful reputation, resulted in him being ignored. He was labeled “warmonger” by many, because of his desire to be well prepared for war when it came. He knew that Hitler had to be confronted in a war, and he wanted to defeat him “*into unconditional surrender*”<sup>9</sup>. The historian **Geoffrey Best** states, in response to those who considered Churchill a “warmonger”,

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<sup>4</sup> Stewart, Graham (2001), Burying Caesar. The Overlook Press, Peter Mayer Publishers, New York. Page 290.

<sup>5</sup> Corbishley, Mike, John Gillingham, Rosemary Kelly, Ian Dawson, James Mason (1996), Op. Cit. Page 365.

<sup>6</sup> Reynolds, E.E. and N.H. Brasher (1966), Britain in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1964. The Cambridge University Press, Great Britain. Page 184.

<sup>7</sup> Ray, John (1970), Men Who Made History: Lloyd George and Churchill. Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, Great Britain. Page 27.

<sup>8</sup> Idem.

<sup>9</sup> Ray, John. Op. Cit. Page 33.

that he only was in favor of armed services when these had a “*clear defensive and diplomatic purpose*”<sup>10</sup>. Churchill did become interested in war during this period, because he had been worried about Germany every since the Treaty of Versailles had been signed. He “*feared military resurgence from the earliest moment*”<sup>11</sup>. Chamberlain believed that, “*at worst, a possible war fought later would be more likely to be successful than a certain war fought now*”<sup>12</sup>; which would allow them “*to take on Hitler from a position of strength*”<sup>13</sup>. Churchill, however, wanted to defeat Hitler as soon as possible. This difference in opinions led to their extreme reputations, one as “appeaser”, the other as “warmonger.” With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that neither one fits that profile.

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<sup>10</sup> Best, Geoffrey (2001), Op. Cit. Page 17.

<sup>11</sup> Idem. Page 153.

<sup>12</sup> Stewart, Graham. Op. Cit. Page 316.

<sup>13</sup> Idem. Page 311.

## C) EVALUATION OF SOURCES

When analyzing historical documents, one must take into account various factors to establish their historical relevance. **Graham Stewart**, a British historian published **“Burying Caesar, the Churchill-Chamberlain Rivalry”**, in the year 2001. His aim was to analyze more in depth the differences between both politicians, such as their disagreement over the Munich settlement. He approaches the issue in an objective manner, as he tries to make the reader understand why the politicians acted the way they did, instead of simply condemning them if they acted incorrectly. For instance, the preface asks the question, *“was there a reasonable basis for Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler?”*<sup>14</sup>. Since it is written approximately sixty years after the events took place, the writer has the benefit of hindsight, allowing him to analyze with more clarity and objectivity. He also has the advantage of having more information available, not only primary sources, but other secondary sources, such as other historians’ views on the event. However, at times, I noticed that the author reveals his preference for Churchill, as when he claims that he was *“always magnanimous”*<sup>15</sup>, yet refers to Chamberlain as a man who *“demonstrated his inability to grasp the full measure of the man with whom he was dealing”*<sup>16</sup>. Though the author tries to be objective, he still makes conclusions with considerable amounts of bias, as when he claims that postponing war was not *“the ultimate goal of Chamberlain’s policy”*<sup>17</sup>. This is an issue that is still debated nowadays, since Chamberlain could well have been postponing war in order to rearm.

**“Britain in the Twentieth Century,”** on the other hand, was published in 1966; the British authors **Reynolds and Brasher** *“lived throughout the whole period”*<sup>18</sup>, making this book a primary source<sup>19</sup>. It is limited since it is written soon after the events described, which makes it more susceptible to the opinions and emotions of its writer. It reflects the context which was lived at that time, therefore it is more subjective than the other source.

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<sup>14</sup> Stewart, Graham. Op. Cit. Preface.

<sup>15</sup> Idem. Page . 288.

<sup>16</sup> Idem. Page 290.

<sup>17</sup> Idem. Page 316.

<sup>18</sup> Reynolds, E.E. and N.H. Brasher (1966), Britain in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1964. The Cambridge University Press, Great Britain. Preface.

However, since it is a primary document, it also has great value for historians as it reveals the thoughts, worries, emotions and opinions of many people that lived through that time. Both books focus mainly on Chamberlain's flaws, such as when **Reynolds and Brasher** state that Chamberlain, "*unfortunately lacked the necessary experience and knowledge of international problems*"<sup>20</sup>. They lay the blame on Chamberlain for the start of war, when in fact, his preparation may or may not have been outstanding, but what made him act the way he did was, primarily, his desire to keep his country out of war. His failure cannot be attributed solely to his personal defects.

These sources are valuable as historical evidence for different purposes. "**Burying Caesar**" analyzes more in depth the rivalry between both politicians, and pays less attention to the facts, while "**Britain in the Twentieth Century**" focuses more on the events, paying more attention to the general scenario of those years.

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<sup>19</sup> It is a primary source if our topic of study is the policy of appeasement, narrated by people who lived during that period. It could also be considered secondary, if we expected it to be written during the time of appeasement.

<sup>20</sup> Reynolds, E.E. and N.H. Brasher (1966), Britain in the Twentieth Century. 1900-1964. The Cambridge University Press, Great Britain. Page 175.

## D) ANALYSIS

Most historians nowadays criticize appeasement. This is because they evaluate the facts with the benefit of hindsight; they know what happened later: the war. It is easy to criticize something once you know its outcome. Instead, one should analyze in depth the appeasers' intentions, situated in the historical context of that time.

The consequences of the First World War were negative for the majority of Britain's population; "*almost every British family had lost at least one relative in the Great War*"<sup>21</sup>. I believe this is mainly what made Chamberlain create this policy of appeasement. But, was Chamberlain really avoiding war because people desperately wished for peace? Or could it be, as **AJP Taylor** states, that Chamberlain genuinely believed Hitler to be a "*good man*"<sup>22</sup>? These are two major inquiries regarding Chamberlain. The Historian **Ruth Henig**, partly justifies Chamberlain's policy by establishing that, "*[Chamberlain] saw such a Reich as a strong barrier to Bolshevik expansion westwards*"<sup>23</sup>. Chamberlain felt that by letting Hitler's Reich grow and become stronger, it could act as a 'buffer zone', protecting the Western civilization from the feared Bolsheviks. Churchill too disliked the Bolsheviks, like most British, yet he didn't hesitate in offering them help during the war because, as he says, "*any man or State who fights on against Nazism will have our aid.*"<sup>24</sup> (see Appendix 5).

Churchill, on the other hand, "*feared German military resurgence from the earliest moment*"<sup>25</sup>, the Treaty of Versailles. Churchill was aware of the danger of this treaty, for it had been extremely harsh and unfair for the German people. He warned Britain, and declared that Hitler, "*should be stopped right away*"<sup>26</sup>. Churchill's predictions were ignored because they meant that Britain would become involved in a war that almost everyone wished to avoid. In fact, "*many politicians and most of the publics of Britain and France, were, to put it crudely, keener on hearing what Hitler said about peace than what Churchill*

<sup>21</sup> Wood, Derek (1984), This Modern World. Heinemann Educational Books, London. Page 61.

<sup>22</sup> Taylor, AJP (1964), The Origins of the Second World War, Penguin books in association with Hamish Hamilton, Great Britain. Page 237.

<sup>23</sup> Henig, Ruth (1985), The Origins of the Second World War (1933-1939). Methuen & Co. Ltd: London and New York. Page 27.

<sup>24</sup> Ray, John (1970), Men Who Made History: Lloyd George and Churchill. Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, Great Britain. Page 32.

<sup>25</sup> Best, Geoffrey (2001), Op. Cit. Page 153.

<sup>26</sup> Corbishley, Mike, John Gillingham, Rosemary Kelly, Ian Dawson, James Mason (1996), The Young Oxford History of Britain & Ireland. Oxford University Press, Great Britain. Page 365.

*said about war*<sup>27</sup>. People often believe what they *want* to believe, in other words, that “peace for our time” had reached Europe. Contemporary historians like **Eric Hobsbawm**, confident that a settlement with Hitler was impossible, consider Churchill to be the only politician who was “*realistic on the question of Germany*”<sup>28</sup>.

After the Munich settlement (See Appendix 6), Churchill accused Chamberlain of, “been giving the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor and you will have war”<sup>29</sup>. The appeaser was described as someone who “feeds a crocodile-hoping it will eat him last”<sup>30</sup>. Yet one must try to understand why Chamberlain chose that policy, instead of reiterating its dishonorable failure (See Appendix 7). Chamberlain was influenced greatly by the public opinion, that “was consistently opposed to rapid rearmament and a stronger stand being taken against dictators”<sup>31</sup>. At the time, the danger of Hitler was not predicted, but instead, they felt that a strong Germany would protect them from Bolshevik Russia. We must remember that we are analyzing the situation with the advantage of time, therefore it is easier to condemn their line of action.

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<sup>27</sup> Best, Geoffrey (2001), Op. Cit. Page 150.

<sup>28</sup> Hobsbawm, Eric (1995), The Age of Extremes: A History of the World. 1914-1991. A Division of Random House, mc, New York. Page 154.

<sup>29</sup> Enright, Dominique (2001), The Wicked Wit of Winston Churchill. Michael O’Mara Books Limited, Great Britain. Page 63.

<sup>30</sup> Enright, Dominique (2001), Op. Cit. Page 44.

<sup>31</sup> McDonough, Franc, The Origins of the First and Second World Wars, Cambridge University: Cambridge, UK. Page 95.



## VI) CONCLUSION

After having analyzed the various interpretations historians have about the different foreign policies of these politicians the years previous to World War II, I arrived to my own conclusion. The fact that I based my work on some books written during or shortly after the events and on others written recently, made it possible for me to understand the way British authors visualized these politicians in different time periods.

Chamberlain should be understood, as he was extremely influenced by the circumstances that existed at that time, and he was, “*acting on advice*”<sup>32</sup>. According to my perspective, another motive that prevented Chamberlain from “*grasping Hitler’s evil intentions early enough*”<sup>33</sup>, was his naive and weak personality. This view is reflected by **Ruth Henig**, who portrays Chamberlain as, “*stupid and pathetic... frightened to stand up Hitler.*”<sup>34</sup> Yet it could be argued that he was just acting on his pacifist notions. Can we really criticize Chamberlain for trying to avoid war? A new question arose as a result of this investigation, is it true, as Churchill stated, “*that there never was a war more easy to stop?*”<sup>35</sup>.

It must be taken into account that Churchill was able to come up with accurate predictions during that same period. This is because, as **Eric Hobsbawm** states, Churchill was the only politician who, “*was realistic on the question of Germany*”<sup>36</sup>. This is why, though Chamberlain shouldn’t be condemned, his line of action shouldn’t be justified either. Churchill was able to foresee the dangerous consequences of the Treaty of Versailles and of Hitler’s ambitions, while Chamberlain was unable to do so. This reveals Churchill’s realistic, cautious nature, in contrast with Chamberlain’s fearful, innocent and easily manipulative way of being.

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<sup>32</sup> Tapp, Edwin (1978), Polices of Survival. Heinemann Educational Books, Hong Kong. Page 18.

<sup>33</sup> Henig, Ruth (1985), The Origins of the Second World War (1933-1939). Methuen & Co. Ltd: London and New York. Page 37.

<sup>34</sup> Idem.

<sup>35</sup> Idem.

<sup>36</sup> Hobsbawm, Eric (1995), The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991. A Division of Random House, Inc, New York. Page 154.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1

#### **Neville Chamberlain**

“He was born at Birmingham, eldest child of Joseph Chamberlain by his second wife Florence Kenrick, on March 18, 1869, a year in destiny both in Birmingham and the world beyond... His mother died in child birth on the eve of his sixth birthday... It separated them from their father... Twice widowed within twelve years before he was forty, he encased himself in outward armor, grimly finished off his mayoralty, in 1876 entered Parliament, buried himself under tides of work... Though he sincerely loved his children, we hear Neville’s word “for a good many years I respected and feared him more than I loved him”...

**Feiling, Keith (1970), The Life of Neville Chamberlain. Archon Books, Great Britain.**

**Page 7.**

(1869-1940) British statesman. Younger son of Joseph Chamberlain, he entered Parliament as a Conservative in 1918 and received his first ministerial appointment in 1922. As Minister of Health (1924-29) under Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, he obtained important social legislation dealing with pensions, housing, and local government reform. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer in Ramsay MacDonald’s national government (1931-35), and continued in that office in the ministry formed by Baldwin in 1935. In 1937 he succeeded Baldwin as prime Minister. Chamberlain now made foreign affairs his chief concern, adopting a policy of appeasement toward German dictator Adolf Hitler. When, in the summer of 1938, Germany seemed about to attack Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain requested a meeting with Hitler. In the ensuing discussion at Berchtesgaden, Chamberlain emerged as the “man of peace”, prepared to make any sacrifice to avoid war. Hitler demanded self-determination for the German-speaking inhabitants of Czech Sudetenland, and at their next meeting (at Bad Godesberg) Chamberlain acquiesced, only to learn that Hitler now demanded immediate cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. War seemed imminent, and Chamberlain made a last appeal to Hitler, suggesting another meeting at which French and Italian representatives would be present. The news of Hitler’s invitation to come to Munich was received by the House of Commons as a reprieve from war. By the Munich Treaty Germany gained the

Sudetenland Chamberlain returned to a grateful London. In Mar., 1939, Hitler occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia and in September attacked Poland. After German victories in Norway in the spring of 1940, Chamberlain's position became untenable. He resigned on May 10, when Germany launched its attack on Holland, Belgium and France. He became Lord president of the Council in the government of Winston Churchill. He died a few months later.

**Grolier Universal Enciclopedia, Volume 2, Stratford Press, Inc., New York. 1966. Page 556.**

## **APPENDIX 2**

### **Definition of the policy of appeasement**

“The way in which the British chose to avoid such a situation was to use a policy of appeasement towards countries like Germany which might threaten the empire.

Appeasement meant agreeing to whichever of their demands seemed reasonable in order to prevent them from starting a war. Although this might make them stronger, it was less of a threat to Britain and the empire than going to war with them.”

**Wood, Derek (1984), This Modern World. Heinemann Educational Books, London. Page 25.**

Churchill: “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile hoping it will eat him last”.

**Enright, Dominique (2001), The Wicked Wit of Winston Churchill. Michael O'Mara Books Limited, Great Britain. Page 44.**

## **APPENDIX 3**

“**Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill** was born in 1874 at Blenheim Palace, Oxfordshire, the eldest son of Lord Randolph Churchill and his American wife, and nephew of the Duke of Marlborough. Despite an undistinguished career at Harrow, he attended the RMA, Sandhurst, before being gazetted to the 4<sup>th</sup> Hussars. Following service in India and on the North-West Frontier, he took part in the Nile Expeditionary force in Sudan in 1898... As a newspaper correspondent during the Boer War of 1899-1901 he was captured when the armoured train he was traveling in was ambushed and derail, but later successfully escaped

his captors and made an epic journey back to British lines... Churchill entered Parliament as a Conservative MP in 1900 but, finding himself increasingly at odds with the party, in 1906 crossed the floor of the House and joined the Liberal Party, becoming Under-Secretary for the Colonies in 1908 and President of the Board of trade a year later, in which post he introduced labour exchanges... He increasingly warned from the backbenches of the dangers of German rearmament, of appeasement of the dictators, and of Britain's absolute lack of preparedness for war, referring to the Munich settlement of 1938 as a 'total and unmitigated defeat'. The fall of Norway in May 1940, and the imminent threat to British forces in France and to Britain herself, led to a vote of no confidence in the administration headed by Neville Chamberlain, whom Churchill succeeded as Prime Minister, immediately forming a Coalition Government. Despite the disasters in Belgium and France, victory in the Battle of Britain, followed by success at sea and in North Africa, helped to stiffen the country's sinews, aided immeasurably by Churchill's leadership and his oratory... His ability both to flatter and to stand up to Stalin promoted a relationship with the Soviet Union that helped to ensure the defeat of the Axis. After German defeats in North Africa and Russia, and American naval victories over the Japanese in the Pacific, the tide of war began to turn, and Churchill increasingly directed his formidable talents to the total defeat of Germany, Italy and Japan and the maintenance of the Triple Alliance which was to bring that about. He was not to share in the final triumph, however; in the general election of July 1945, two months after Germany's unconditional surrender, the war-weary British people voted the Labour Party into power, and Churchill handed over the premiership to Clement Attlee...

In 1951, aged seventy-seven, he became Prime Minister again, resigning in 1955... He died, full of years and honours, in 1965 and, after a magnificent state funeral, was buried in the graveyard of the tiny parish church close to Blenheim Palace, the house in which he had been born".

**Enright, Dominique (2001), The Wicked Wit of Winston Churchill. Michael O'Mara Books Limited, Great Britain. Page 9.**

#### **APPENDIX 4**

The Pacifist Spirit in Britain in the 1930's

A young writer voices the widespread horror of war:

“I believe, with every fibre in my being, that the hour has struck in the world's history when every man who wishes to serve his country must realize that Patriotism is the worst service he can offer to it. The time has come when it must be definitely admitted that Patriotism is an evil, in every country- the German patriot is as great a sinner as the English patriot or the American patriot or the Italian patriot. The time has come when this word-a hallowed word, I admit, that calls up memories for sublime sacrifice and deathless heroism-must be recognized as having changed its meaning, and as having lost its sense and its virtue.”

**Tapp, Edwin (1978), Polices of Survival. Heinemann Educational Books, Hong Kong. Page 15.**

#### **APPENDIX 5**

“Any man or State who fights on against Nazism will have our aid. . . It follows therefore that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people. We shall appeal to all our friends and allies in every part of the world to take the same course and pursue it, as we shall, faithfully and steadfastly to the end...”

**Ray, John (1970), Men Who Made History: Lloyd George and Churchill. Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, Great Britain. Page 32.**

**APPENDIX 6**

“The Munich agreement is the pivot upon which Chamberlain’s subsequent reputation has swung. To those who saw it as a betrayal, a stain upon Britain’s History and a missed opportunity to hit Hitler hard before he was ready, the Prime Minister’s negotiation eternally damned him as the foremost of the ‘guilty men’. To his supporters at the time, it was a valiant attempt to preserve peace that failed only because of Hitler’s subsequent and unimaginably dastardly behaviour... To his defenders amongst historians today, Chamberlain was not the dupe of the devil incarnate but a shrewd politician who knew that war would very likely be a disaster not just for the Czechs and the British but for a western civilization itself. This interpretation of his motives subdivides into two camps, those who believe Chamberlain hoped that war could be postponed indefinitely. And those who believe he was seeking to postpone it only until Britain was in a position to right its military deficiencies and take on Hitler from a position of strength.

**Stewart, Graham (2001), Btirying Caesar. The Overlook Press, Peter Mayer Publishers, New York. Page 311.**

**APPENDIX 7**

At the time Chamberlain said ‘No!’

“Hitler soon broke his promise. But before we condemn Chamberlain remember he was acting on advice. Two weeks before the Munich meeting the British Chiefs of Staff reported on the question, ‘Whether it would be to our military advantage to fight Germany now or to postpone the issue.’ They answered: ‘From the military point of view the balance of advantage is definitely in favour of postponement.. .we are in bad condition to wage even a defensive war at the present time.’”

**Tapp, Edwin (1978), Polices of Survival. Heinemann Educational Books, Hong Kong, Page 18.**

## Assessment criteria

Criterion	Total marks	Marks achieved	Examiner comments
<b>A</b>	2	2	The focus of the investigation is clear enough to merit two marks. The methodology is clearly stated.
<b>B</b>	5	3	The views of both Churchill and Chamberlain are clearly stated. Too much reference to the authors of the sources and a drift towards evaluation at one point, to merit full marks.
<b>C</b>	4	3	Evaluation of the Stewart text is appropriate although comment undeveloped. Comments on <i>Britain in the Twentieth Century</i> are not appropriate (it is not a primary source). Reasonable comment on the usefulness of both.
<b>D</b>	5	3	Makes a sound attempt to analyse both Chamberlain and Churchill's thinking and motivation. Too much comment on hindsight.
<b>E</b>	2	2	The conclusion is supported by the evidence presented; it could be clearer on Churchill's motives.
<b>F</b>	2	2	Extensive and clearly structured bibliography. The investigation is written within the word limit.
<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>15</b>	A well-researched investigation that at times becomes unfocused. Comment is not always fully developed.



## **Example 5: The Women's Army Corps during World War II**

### **Section A : Plan of Investigation**

The subject of this investigation fits into the category of “Causes, Practices, and Effects of War.” This investigation will center upon the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) during World War II. The essay will discuss mainly the purpose of the Women’s Army Corps. and what it accomplished during the Second World War, The reasons behind the formation of the Women’s Army Corps will be discussed and the controversy over whether women should be allowed in the army at that time will be evaluated. Both sides of the controversy are shown as well as the historical results. Sources to be evaluated include written first hand experiences of WAC officers Catherine Ott, Genevieve Chasm, and commanding officer Barbara Gwynne. Other sources to be evaluated include opposing male and female viewpoints on the topic.

Word Count: 130

### **Section B: Summary of Evidence**

In the United States a woman’s place was always at home and in constant support of her husband. But, when World War II struck, this had to change. The husbands went off the war and the best way that a wife could support her husband was to join the war effort. The average woman believed that if she could help In the war effort then the war would end sooner. (Trimmer) this began the Women’s Army corps (WAC) and was a significant part of the fight in World War II. “They were a group of women that stood on their own in the absence of men and did the work of men.” (Trimmer)

World War II was the first time in the United State’s history that the Armed Service accepted women. Despite the original goal of 25,000 women, between 150,000 and 200,000 women served in the army during World War II, about 700 of which were decorated. The Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) was established in May 1942. It soon became known as the Women’s Army Corps. (WAC). (Goldstein 2001) Oveta Cuip Hobby was the director of the Women’s Army Corps and had the duty of showing the public that a woman could be lady-like and be in the army at the same time. (Bellafaire) The majority of WACs joined because they saw it as their duty. As former WAC

Commanding Officer, Barbara T. Gwynne said, “I didn’t have the gall to stay out... practically every single person that I knew, who was able to walk, went in to try to help the country. I felt it was my job to help, too”.

The first WAC training center was in Fort Des Moines, Iowa. Upon completing training, the WACs were sent to either the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, or Army Service Forces and put to work. Many were sent abroad to places such as France and England. Some women became pilots and some became radio operators. But, about 50% were assigned to clerical duties. By 1944, WACs had been stationed in the Pacific, Mediterranean and North Africa. (Bellafaire)

The Women’s Army Corps allowed woman to join who were between the ages of 21 and 45. During their service, they were provided with food, uniforms, living quarters, pay, and medical care. (Bellafaire) 7 An enlisted woman was called an “auxiliary.” They received ranks of first, second, and third officers, similarly to the men’s rankings of captains and lieutenants. Other WACs had ranks such as chief leaders and junior leaders. The Women’s Army Corps even contained 40 black women. They were not allowed to attend events with the rest of the corps and everything was segregated.

But, issues arose as to whether women belonged in wars. WACs were not allowed near combat areas. (Goldstein, 2001) But, studies show that women performed just as well as men during the war. Women were not shown to suffer more health problems and numbers of nonbattle injuries were almost equal WAC got pregnant, she was immediately dismissed and sent home. (Goldstein, 2001) But, men were still uncomfortable with the idea of women in the army. So, women were not allowed to command men and a woman received less pay for doing the same duty as a man. (Bellafaire)

At the end of the war, the Army requested that the Women’s Army Corps be allowed to remain in existence. In 1948, a bill passed to allow women to serve in the army in clerical positions but women could still not see combat.

Word Count: 588

### **Section C: Evaluation of Sources**

Three distinct written first hand accounts were used from women who served in the Women’s Army Corps. ‘From the Junior League to a WAC Commanding Officer’, “A Young Girl Joins the War Effort” and “A Woman in a Man’s War” all show reasons behind why a woman would have wanted to become a part of the war effort and what it was like to be the center of such controversy. These sources are highly valuable due to the fact that women who experienced the Women’s Army Corps wrote them. No one else would know better what she were feeling during her service in World War II than the women themselves. This thoroughly shows the viewpoint of a woman in the armed service.

But, these accounts are limited. They are biased and show only the view of women who were in the Women's Army Corps. This is why other sources were needed as well.

The book, World War II: Opposing Viewpoints was used to show what other people thought about women in the army in World War II. This book is a collection of articles, most of which are editorials about World War II. These articles, written in 1942-1944, show the Women's Army Corps from another viewpoint. While the women in the WAC said that they were thoroughly helping their country by being in the army, these authors said that they are hurting the nation by not being at home. This source is just as valuable as the WAC's first hand accounts. This author was also alive during World War II and saw exactly what was going on, just from a different viewpoint, the viewpoint of a civilian. This article is limited in the fact that it is an editorial and is biased due to the fact that it is written on the author's point of view and opinion.

Other sources used include books such as *War and Gender* by Joshua Goldstein and *Women and War* by Jean Bethke Elshtein. These books contained substantial information about the Women's Army Corps in World War II. These sources were valuable because they were unbiased and simply stated the facts. The books were not as limited as the first-hand accounts. The books stated the facts regardless of whether they supported or went against the women's cause. But, these sources are not as reliable as the first hand accounts. A huge problem involved the numbers of women who enlisted. Each book contained a different total. So, a limitation only allowed for the discovery of a range of women who enlisted and not an exact number.

Word Count 397

### **Section D : Analysis**

There is no doubt that women played a useful role during World War II. All sources show that the women were extremely motivated to help and that their presence and morale helped the actual combat officers as well. During World War II, there was much controversy over whether women should be allowed to serve in the army. Many people believed that a woman's place was in the home. But, many people believed that the nation needed all the help it could get. Despite the controversy over the Women's Army Corps at the time, all sources show that the presence and assistance of women in the war effort made a big difference and was indeed a great help to the nation.

Most women in the army held clerical and interpretation jobs. They worked in offices and translated hour upon hour of Morse code for the nation. Some women worked in army postage offices, sorting mail to be sent from officers to their families. Other flew planes, built in factories, and worked on bases. Their morale and presence uplifted the soldiers and sailors and helped to relieve the stress of being at war. As shown in studies, women completed the clerical work faster and had much more patience while translating the Morse code. So, overall, women benefited the war effort.

But, the controversy over whether women belong on the front lines of a war or if women should be a part of combat was not solved. Congress passed the bill to allow the Women's Army Corps (WAC) to remain in existence after the conclusion of World War II. But, women were still not allowed to participate in combat duties. Most WACs were content with going home after the war and starting a family.

The Women's Army Corps (WAC) began with women who wanted to help serve their country in any way they could. They did their job and felt content with what they did. They were ready to go home and live their old lives once again. All sources support this fact. The first hand accounts say this and statistics from other sources support this fact as well. Every source used supports that the women who served in the armed forces in World War II did what they had to do and were a great help.

Word Count: 404

## **Section E: Conclusion**

World War II called for the recruitment of many men to become soldiers and sailors. This act left the women of the nation alone to tend to the household. But, women wanted to do more to help their nation and bring their men home as soon as possible. The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) was formed in May 1942 and soon became known as the Women's Army Corps (WAC). The original goal was to recruit 25,000 women for clerical and communications duties to relieve men to go to the front line combat. But, it rapidly grew to include 150,000 to 200,000 women. The role of the WACs grew to also include building in factories and flying planes in the air force. Women were included in companies and a ranking system was established to allow women to receive promotions to first, second, and third officers.

But, controversy soon arose over whether women should be allowed to work in the army. Many people saw women as distracting and some even called the WACs "tramps" who only wanted to find a husband. Many believed that the woman's place was in the home and that she were neglecting her family duties to go play in the dirt with the boys.

At the end of the war, the women's hard work was rewarded. Congress voted to allow the Women's Army Corps to remain in existence. Many were decorated and most got to return home and return to their duty of tending to the family. Only, now they had a feeling of accomplishment and a nation that accepted them more.

Word Count: 254

Word Count : 1773

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**Section F: Sources**

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## Assessment criteria

Criterion	Total marks	Marks achieved	Examiner comments
<b>A</b>	2	2	The plan of the investigation is clear and concise, but perhaps rather ambitious.
<b>B</b>	5	2	Some interesting, relevant evidence is recorded, but also some material that is too general. All the references should have page numbers, and the plan should be followed more closely.
<b>C</b>	4	2	Source evaluation is too superficial and the required details of the sources (author, date of publication, publisher) are not given. Value and limitation need more precise evaluation.
<b>D</b>	5	1	Analysis is not applied closely and consistently to the evidence presented in B. Instead, personal opinions are offered in a rather general way, as well as evidence rather than analysis.
<b>E</b>	2	1	The conclusion refers to some aspects listed in the plan, but not to all. Again, it tends to be too general.
<b>F</b>	2	2	The investigation is within the word limit, and the sources are listed correctly, but there is no indication that many of the sources have been used.
<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>10</b>	An interesting topic that needs to follow the criteria more closely, and to reflect better analysis and evaluation.